# Gemini ## Introduction to the Third Ethical Framework: Virtue Ethics The lecture commences by situating the day's topic, virtue ethics, within the broader context of the course. This is presented as the third and final major ethical theory to be examined, following previous discussions on utilitarianism and deontology. An ethical theory is a systematic framework that attempts to provide a coherent and comprehensive account of what makes actions morally right or wrong, and what constitutes a good or bad character. These theories serve as conceptual tools to guide moral reasoning, decision-making, and the evaluation of human conduct. Before delving into the new material, the lecturer offers an opportunity for questions regarding the preceding theories or administrative aspects of the subject, such as assignments. This practice establishes a dialogical learning environment and ensures that the foundational knowledge from previous weeks is secure before building upon it. The plan for the lecture is then outlined: first, to describe the core principles of virtue ethics, and second, to apply this understanding to contemporary issues in technology and artificial intelligence. A key pedagogical strategy mentioned is the use of contrast. By comparing and contrasting virtue ethics with utilitarianism and deontology, the unique features and underlying assumptions of each theory are brought into sharper relief, leading to a more profound and nuanced understanding of all three. To understand this contrast, it is essential to have a foundational grasp of the two preceding theories. **Utilitarianism** is a consequentialist theory, meaning it judges the morality of an action based solely on its outcomes or consequences. The core principle of utilitarianism is the "principle of utility," which states that the right action is the one that maximizes overall happiness, well-being, or "utility" for the greatest number of people. The intentions or character of the person performing the action are considered irrelevant to the moral assessment of the act itself. **Deontology**, most famously articulated by Immanuel Kant, is a non-consequentialist theory. It posits that the morality of an action is inherent in the action itself, based on whether it adheres to a set of universal moral rules or duties. For a deontologist, certain actions are intrinsically right or wrong, regardless of the consequences they produce. The focus is on the motive of duty and adherence to moral law. Virtue ethics will present a fundamentally different approach, shifting the focus away from actions and consequences and onto the character of the moral agent. ## Deconstructing the Concept of "Virtue" The lecture begins its exploration of virtue ethics by examining the central term itself: "virtue." The lecturer gauges the audience's familiarity with the word, noting that while many have heard of it, it is not a term commonly used in modern, everyday conversation. This observation highlights a shift in cultural and linguistic norms, where concepts of character are perhaps discussed using different terminology. To illustrate its historical and cultural presence, common sayings are invoked, such as "Patience is a virtue." This aphorism, often told to impatient children, frames virtue as a desirable quality or character trait that requires cultivation. Another saying, "Virtue is its own reward," suggests that the value of being a virtuous person is intrinsic; one does not need external validation or benefit because the state of being virtuous is itself the ultimate good. The discussion then pivots to a more contemporary and often negative usage of the term: "virtue signalling." This concept has gained prominence, particularly in critiques of corporate and individual behavior in the digital age. Virtue signalling is defined as the act of publicly expressing opinions or sentiments that are intended to demonstrate one's good character or moral correctness, but without necessarily possessing the underlying virtue or taking meaningful action. The primary motivation is not genuine moral commitment but the acquisition of social credit or the enhancement of one's reputation. The provided cartoon serves as a pointed example: a person expresses satisfaction not from the act of helping the homeless, but from the social media engagement ("10,000 reblogs") their post about it received. This illustrates the core of virtue signalling: the focus is on the appearance of virtue, a form of "phoniness or superficiality," rather than the substance of a virtuous character and its corresponding actions. Having addressed this derogatory usage, the lecture clarifies that its focus will be on the positive, philosophical conception of virtue. This positive view sees virtues as genuine excellences of character—stable, reliable traits that dispose a person to think, feel, and act in morally good ways. A visual aid displaying words like "love," "fairness," "integrity," and "bravery" reinforces this idea, presenting virtues as the foundational components of a good and admirable character. This sets the stage for a deeper dive into the philosophical tradition that takes these character traits as the primary subject of ethical inquiry. ## Historical and Philosophical Foundations of Virtue Ethics The lecture grounds the theory of virtue ethics in a rich historical and cross-cultural context, demonstrating that the concern with moral character is not a recent or exclusively Western preoccupation. The work of philosopher Shannon Vallor is introduced. Vallor, a contemporary virtue ethicist from the University of Edinburgh, emphasizes that the cultivation of a virtuous character has been a central theme in various major world traditions long before its formalization in Western philosophy. Two prominent examples are cited: Buddhism and Confucianism. Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, taught a path of enlightenment that involved the development of specific virtues, such as compassion (karuṇā) and wisdom (prajñā). The goal was to transform one's character to overcome suffering and act in ways that benefit all beings. Similarly, in ancient China, Confucius articulated an ethical system centered on the concept of the *junzi*, or the "exemplary person." The junzi is an individual who has cultivated virtues like benevolence (*ren*), righteousness (*yi*), and propriety (*li*). This person is described as "upright and right-seeing," meaning they have developed the moral perception to see situations clearly and respond appropriately. These examples establish that the core idea of virtue ethics—that the primary goal of a moral life is to become a certain kind of person—has deep and diverse roots. The lecture then presents a series of widely recognized historical figures who are often held up as "moral exemplars"—individuals whose lives seem to embody particular virtues. These are not presented as perfect beings, but as powerful illustrations of virtuous character in action. * **Nelson Mandela** is cited for his fight against the systemic injustice of apartheid in South Africa, demonstrating immense courage, perseverance, and a profound commitment to justice. * **Mahatma Gandhi** is highlighted for his life of non-violent resistance and devotion to the people of India, exemplifying virtues of courage, self-sacrifice, and unwavering principle. * **Mother Teresa** is mentioned for her work with the destitute in Calcutta, embodying compassion, selflessness, and care by dedicating her life to alleviating the suffering of others. * **Rosa Parks** is presented as an exemplar of courage and a powerful sense of justice. Her refusal to give up her seat on a bus was not merely an act of defiance but a principled stand against a dehumanizing and unjust law, an act that required immense bravery given the personal risks involved. The lecturer acknowledges that the selection of such figures is often subject to debate and criticism, as historical figures are complex and may have flaws. This nuance is important: the purpose of moral exemplars is not to deify individuals but to provide concrete, tangible models of virtue from which we can learn. To make the concept more personal and profound, the lecturer shares a formative story from his own childhood about **Maximilian Kolbe**, a Polish Catholic priest imprisoned in the Auschwitz concentration camp during World War II. The story recounts how, after a prisoner escaped, the Nazi guards selected ten men for execution by starvation as a reprisal. When one of the condemned men cried out for his wife and children, Kolbe stepped forward and volunteered to take his place. In the starvation cell, Kolbe did not succumb to despair but led the other prisoners in prayer and song, maintaining his dignity and compassion in the face of unimaginable horror. He ultimately died calmly, offering his arm for a lethal injection of carbolic acid. The lecturer explains that this story made a lasting impression on him as a child because it depicted behavior that was "extraordinarily courageous" and "extraordinarily compassionate"—far beyond the norm. Such stories, whether about famous figures or personal acquaintances, play a crucial role in shaping our moral imagination and our understanding of what a good character entails. They provide us with a vision of human possibility that can inspire us to cultivate similar virtues in our own lives. ## The Development of Virtue: From Childhood to Moral Maturity The lecture transitions from historical examples to the psychological and developmental process of acquiring virtues. It posits that moral character is not something we are born with but is cultivated over time through a process of learning, habituation, and experience. This process begins in early childhood, primarily within the family unit. Parents or guardians are typically the first moral educators. They provide feedback on a child's behavior, correcting harmful actions and praising positive ones. For instance, if a child hurts a sibling, a parent might intervene, explaining that such behavior is unacceptable and encouraging them to be a "kind person" rather than a "cruel" or "callous" one. This is not just about prohibiting a single action but about shaping the child's underlying disposition. Conversely, when a child acts well, they receive positive reinforcement. A parent might say, "You're such a generous and honest person," or "You're a good friend." This language does more than praise an act; it attributes a positive character trait to the child, helping them to form a self-concept centered on these virtues. Storytelling is another powerful tool in this developmental process. Fairy tales, myths, religious stories, and modern media like movies often present clear archetypes of virtuous heroes and vicious villains. These narratives provide children with a moral vocabulary and a framework for understanding different character types and their consequences. As an individual matures, their understanding of these virtues deepens and becomes more sophisticated. A child's concept of "loyalty" or "courage" is likely to be simple and rudimentary. Through life experience, reflection, and encountering more complex situations, their understanding evolves. They learn the nuances of what courage requires in different contexts, or how to balance the virtue of loyalty with other virtues like honesty. This leads to a crucial point, first observed by the ancient Greek philosopher **Aristotle**, who is the foundational figure of Western virtue ethics. Aristotle noted that while we see child prodigies in fields like mathematics or music, we do not see "child moral geniuses" or "ethical whiz kids." This is because moral wisdom is not a matter of raw intellectual talent; it is a form of practical knowledge that can only be acquired through lived experience. It takes time to develop the emotional maturity, the perceptual sensitivity, and the sound judgment that constitute a virtuous character. Virtue, therefore, is a product of a long-term process of habituation and refinement, a journey toward moral maturity that unfolds over a lifetime. ## The Core of Virtue Ethics: Character over Rules and Consequences Having established the developmental nature of virtue, the lecture now crystallizes the central tenets of virtue ethics, primarily through the lens of Aristotle, and contrasts it sharply with utilitarianism and deontology. Aristotle, a student of Plato who lived over 2,000 years ago, shifted the primary question of ethics. While a utilitarian might ask, "What action will produce the best consequences?" and a deontologist might ask, "What is my duty in this situation?", Aristotle and subsequent virtue ethicists ask a more fundamental question: **"What sort of person should I strive to be?"** The focus is not on isolated actions or adherence to abstract rules, but on the cultivation of a praiseworthy character—a character that warrants respect and emulation. This is not a matter of subjective preference or cultural relativism. Virtue ethics, in its classical form, is non-relativist; it asserts that there are objectively good character traits that are universally conducive to human flourishing. The lecture then systematically contrasts virtue ethics with the other two theories: * **Shared Ground with Deontology:** Virtue ethics joins deontology in rejecting utilitarianism's singular focus on consequences. Both agree that there is more to morality than simply calculating outcomes. The inner state of the agent—their intentions, motives, and character—is morally significant. * **Divergence from Deontology:** However, unlike deontology, virtue ethics does not replace the focus on consequences with a set of duties or a decision procedure for identifying them (like Kant's Categorical Imperative). Instead, it proposes that we determine the right action by referring to the virtues. The right thing to do is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances. This approach fundamentally reorients our understanding of morality. It suggests that deontology and utilitarianism overlook crucial aspects of our ethical lives, particularly our **feelings, emotions, attitudes, and dispositions** (stable tendencies to behave in certain ways). For a virtue ethicist, it is not enough to simply *do* the right thing; one must also have the right inner state. One should *feel* compassion for the suffering, *despise* injustice, and *enjoy* being honest. These emotional and dispositional components are not incidental but are integral to what it means to be a good person. The shopkeeper example is used to make this distinction concrete. Why is it wrong to cheat a customer? * **The Utilitarian Answer:** It is wrong because it will likely lead to bad consequences (the customer's unhappiness, damage to the shop's reputation, a decrease in overall utility). * **The Deontologist's Answer:** It is wrong because it violates a moral duty, such as the duty to be honest or the duty not to use others as a mere means to an end. * **The Virtue Ethicist's Answer:** While agreeing with the wrongness of the act, the virtue ethicist adds a crucial dimension. It is wrong because a good, honest, and fair person would be *repelled* by the very idea of cheating. They wouldn't have to struggle against a temptation to be dishonest; their character would be such that dishonesty is simply not a live option for them. They would feel compassion for the customer and would find the act of deception itself to be base and ugly. This highlights a core belief of virtue ethics: virtues are essential for living a good life, or what Aristotle called *eudaimonia* (often translated as flourishing or a life well-lived). A vicious person—one who is cruel, dishonest, or cowardly—cannot truly be happy or live a good life, even if they accumulate wealth and power and feel subjective pleasure. True flourishing is impossible without a virtuous character. ## The Spectrum of Virtue: The Doctrine of the Golden Mean A central challenge for any ethical theory is to provide guidance on how to apply its principles in specific situations. How do we know what a virtue like courage or generosity requires of us in a particular context? Aristotle provides a powerful and intuitive framework for this, known as the **Doctrine of the Golden Mean**. This doctrine posits that every virtue is a "mean," or an intermediate state, that lies between two extremes, both of which are vices. One extreme is a **vice of deficiency** (having too little of the quality), and the other is a **vice of excess** (having too much of the quality). Virtue is not about following a rigid rule but about finding the "sweet spot" of feeling and action that is appropriate to the circumstances. This makes ethical judgment a skill, akin to an archer hitting a target. The lecture illustrates this with several examples: * **The Virtue of Courage:** The mean is courage, which involves facing danger when it is appropriate and for the right reasons. * The **deficiency** is **cowardice**, which is the failure to face necessary dangers. * The **excess** is **rashness** or **recklessness**, which is facing danger unnecessarily or without proper judgment. * **The Virtue of Generosity:** The mean is generosity, giving the right amount to the right people at the right time. * The **deficiency** is **stinginess** or **miserliness**, which is giving too little or not at all. * The **excess** is **profligacy** or **wastefulness**, which is giving too much, indiscriminately, or to the point of self-harm. The lecture then explores the more complex and counter-intuitive example of **anger**. While often seen as a purely negative emotion, Aristotle argued that there is such a thing as virtuous anger, or "righteous indignation." The key is appropriateness. * **The Scenario:** A fellow student maliciously steals and deletes your essay, then laughs about it. * **The Analysis:** * **Deficiency:** To feel no anger at all in this situation might be a vice. It could signal a lack of self-respect or a failure to recognize a serious injustice. This would be a vice of **indifference** or **spiritlessness**. * **Excess:** To be consumed by a burning, vengeful hatred that lasts for years would also be a vice. This would be an excessive and disproportionate response. * **The Mean:** The virtuous response is to feel an appropriate amount of anger—an amount that reflects the seriousness of the injustice, motivates you to seek a just resolution, but does not consume you or lead to vicious actions. Crucially, the "mean" is not a fixed mathematical midpoint. It is relative to the individual and, most importantly, to the **context**. The lecturer demonstrates this by showing how the "target" for appropriate anger shifts. The anger appropriate for a stolen essay is far less than the anger appropriate for the murder of a loved one. In the latter case, a much stronger response is called for, and a lack of significant anger would be a profound moral failing. The virtuous person is the one who has the wisdom to perceive the context and calibrate their feelings and actions to hit the moving target of the mean. This contextual sensitivity is a hallmark of virtue ethics. ## The Master Virtue: Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) The Doctrine of the Golden Mean reveals that being virtuous is a complex skill. It requires more than just good intentions; it requires sound judgment. This leads to what Aristotle considered a central, or even "master," virtue: **phronesis**, which is translated as **practical wisdom**. Practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue that enables a person to apply their moral virtues effectively in real-world situations. It is the ability to perceive the morally salient features of a context, to understand what a situation truly calls for, and to deliberate correctly about how to act. It is the glue that holds the other virtues together and allows them to be expressed in a coherent and effective way. The need for phronesis becomes especially clear when virtues appear to conflict. The lecture revisits the dilemma of the dying friend who asks you to promise to donate their billion-dollar fortune to a football club. * **The Conflict:** On one hand, you have the virtue of **loyalty** (and honesty, if you make the promise). On the other hand, you have the virtues of **benevolence** and **justice**, which would compel you to use that money to save thousands of lives from starvation. * **The Role of Phronesis:** A person with practical wisdom would not apply a simple rule. They would deliberate on the situation in its entirety. They might reason that in this extreme case, the demands of benevolence are so overwhelming that they override the promise. Or, as the lecturer suggests, a person with phronesis might have navigated the situation differently from the start, perhaps by gently reasoning with their friend before the promise was made, suggesting a way to honor their love for the club while also doing immense good. Practical wisdom is what distinguishes true virtue from what might be called "natural virtue." A person can be naturally kind-hearted but lack the wisdom to express that kindness effectively. The lecturer's anecdote about his mother-in-law illustrates this perfectly. In an attempt to comfort her crying granddaughter who just lost a netball game, she says, "In these sorts of situations, there are always going to be winners and there are always gonna be losers. In this situation, you were the loser." Her intention was compassionate, but her words, lacking practical wisdom, had the opposite effect, causing more distress. True virtue requires both the right feeling (compassion) and the practical wisdom to know how to act on that feeling in a way that is genuinely helpful and appropriate. Like all other virtues, phronesis is not innate. It is developed through experience, observation of wise role models, and the practice of making difficult moral judgments over time. It is the hallmark of a morally mature individual. ## Applying Virtue Ethics to Modern Technology The lecture then bridges the ancient theory of virtue ethics with the pressing challenges of the 21st century, particularly in the realm of artificial intelligence and technology. It returns to the work of philosopher Shannon Vallor, who argues that virtue ethics is uniquely suited to navigating our complex technological world. Vallor's central argument is that the rapid, convergent, and often unpredictable nature of modern technologies creates a great deal of **uncertainty and opacity**. We often cannot foresee the long-term consequences of a new technology (a problem for utilitarianism), nor can we formulate a set of timeless rules to govern it (a problem for deontology). For example, when developing a powerful AI system, the full scope of its societal impact may be impossible to calculate in advance. In this environment of uncertainty, Vallor suggests that the most reliable guide is the **character of the people creating and deploying the technology**. We need to cultivate what she calls **"technomoral virtues."** She proposes a list of virtues crucial for our time, including: * **Honesty:** Being truthful about a technology's capabilities and risks. * **Humility:** Recognizing the limits of our knowledge and avoiding the hubris that technology can solve all human problems. * **Justice:** Ensuring that technologies are developed and used in ways that are fair and do not exacerbate existing inequalities. * **Empathy/Compassion:** Designing systems with a deep understanding of their potential impact on human lives and well-being. * **Courage:** Standing up to corporate or social pressure to deploy a technology that is potentially harmful. At the heart of her framework is **"technomoral wisdom,"** her term for phronesis in the technological age. This is the context-adaptive skill of reasoning well about how to design, use, and regulate technology in a way that promotes human flourishing. The lecture uses the example of early Facebook advertising to illustrate how technology can shape our character. An ad that encourages users to escape a "boring" family gathering by retreating into their phone could be seen as promoting impatience, disrespect, and a weakening of familial bonds. A virtue ethicist asks: What kind of people are we becoming through our constant interaction with these tools? Are they helping us become more patient, civil, and empathetic, or are they eroding these virtues? The ultimate goal, from this perspective, is not just to create technology that avoids harm but to design technology that actively helps us become better people—tools that support and enhance our virtues rather than debilitating them. ## The Ethics of Care: A Related Development The lecture concludes its theoretical exploration by introducing the **Ethics of Care**, a more recent moral framework that emerged from feminist philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century. While it has developed into its own distinct theory, it shares significant common ground with virtue ethics and can be understood as emphasizing a particular set of virtues. The Ethics of Care arose from a critique of traditional ethical theories (like those of Kant and Mill), which were seen by feminist thinkers like Carol Gilligan and Joan Tronto as being based on an abstract, impartial, and overly rationalistic model of the human being. This model, they argued, prioritized principles like justice and autonomy while sidelining equally important moral experiences centered on relationships, vulnerability, and interdependence. The core tenets of the Ethics of Care are: 1. **Relationality:** It starts from the premise that humans are not isolated, self-sufficient individuals but are fundamentally social beings embedded in networks of relationships. 2. **Vulnerability and Dependency:** It recognizes that all humans are vulnerable and dependent on others at various stages of their lives (e.g., in childhood, old age, or illness). Care is a fundamental human need and activity. 3. **The Moral Importance of Care:** It elevates care—which involves attending to the needs of others, listening, feeling empathy, and taking responsibility—to a central moral concept. 4. **Partiality:** Unlike utilitarianism's strict impartiality, the Ethics of Care acknowledges that we have special moral obligations to those with whom we are in caring relationships (e.g., family, friends, community members). These relationships generate specific moral duties. Like other virtues, care is not just a feeling; it is a **practice and a skill**. As Joan Tronto argues, it involves competence. To care well requires practical wisdom (phronesis): knowing when to step in and when to step back, how to listen effectively, and how to provide support in a way that is genuinely helpful and respectful of the other's autonomy. It can also be understood through the lens of the Golden Mean: a **deficiency** of care is indifference or neglect, while an **excess** can manifest as smothering, controlling, or paternalistic behavior that undermines the other person's agency. The Ethics of Care directs our moral attention to the often-overlooked work of maintaining relationships and caring for the vulnerable, urging us to build a society that protects and nourishes these essential human connections. ## Criticisms, Defenses, and Conclusion The lecture concludes by addressing a common criticism leveled against virtue ethics: that it is **too vague** to provide clear guidance in difficult moral situations. Unlike the principle of utility or the categorical imperative, virtue ethics does not offer a straightforward decision-making procedure. Being told to "act as a virtuous person would" might seem unhelpful if one is unsure what that entails. The virtue ethicist has several responses to this charge: 1. **Guidance is Provided:** The theory is not without guidance. It directs us to identify moral exemplars and learn from their example. It also provides the framework of the Golden Mean, which helps us analyze situations in terms of deficiency, excess, and the appropriate middle ground. 2. **Flexibility is a Strength, Not a Weakness:** The "vagueness" can be reframed as a necessary flexibility. Morality is messy, complex, and highly context-sensitive. A rigid, one-size-fits-all rule is often ill-suited to the nuances of real-life ethical dilemmas. Virtue ethics' strength lies in its ability to adapt to different circumstances. As Aristotle himself argued, one should not expect more precision from a subject than the subject matter itself allows. Ethics is not like mathematics; it requires situational appreciation and judgment, which is precisely what practical wisdom provides. The lecture culminates in an interactive poll asking students which of the three theories—utilitarianism, deontology, or virtue ethics—they find to be the strongest. The results show a significant preference for virtue ethics. The lecturer wisely tempers this result by acknowledging the possibility of "recency bias"—the cognitive tendency to give more weight to the most recently discussed topic. Nonetheless, the poll serves as a reflective exercise, prompting students to synthesize their learning and form a preliminary judgment on the merits of each framework. In summary, the lecture has provided a comprehensive introduction to virtue ethics. It has defined the core concepts of virtue, vice, and moral character; traced their historical roots; explained Aristotle's key doctrines of the Golden Mean and practical wisdom; and demonstrated the theory's application to modern technological challenges and its connection to the Ethics of Care. By contrasting it with utilitarianism and deontology, the lecture has illuminated its unique focus on the question, "What kind of person should I be?", presenting it as a rich, flexible, and deeply human approach to the ethical life.